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Abstract 
Much empirical evidence shows that female and male partners look alike along a variety of 
attributes. It is however unclear how this positive sorting comes about, because marriage is  
an equilibrium outcome arising from a process that entails searching, meeting and choosing 
one another. This study takes advantage of a unique data set to shed light on the forces 
driving choices at the earliest stage of a relationship. Both women and men value physical 
attributes, such as age and weight, and reveal that their dating choices are assortative along 
several traits. Importantly, meeting opportunities are found to have a substantial role in 
determining dating proposals. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A well established tradition of social science research has documented the strong 
resemblance of traits and socioeconomic status between husbands and wives. Both men and 
women tend to choose mates of similar age, race, education, and physical appearance (see, 
e.g., Weiss [1997], Kalmijn [1998], Schwartz and Mare [2005], Kurzban and Weeden [2005], 
Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles [2005], and Choo and Siow [2006] for recent analyses and 
reviews). But isolating the forces that lie behind this pattern of positive marital sorting is 
challenging, because marriage is an equilibrium outcome arising from a process that entails 
searching, meeting, and choosing one another. 
In a frictionless world, positive sorting may arise simply as a result of individual 
preferences or technological complementarities in the marital production function (Gale and 
Shapley, 1962; Becker, 1981). For instance, positive sorting can be consistent with aligned or 
“agreed-upon” preferences (whereby everyone values the same attributes) as well as with 
assortative or “likes-attract” preferences (whereby people prefer partners who are similar to 
themselves). 
Search frictions, on the other hand, may lead to positive sorting through alternative 
mechanisms. In particular, matches could be determined by who meets whom, who proposes 
to whom, and who searches where. The first force, who meets whom, implies that meeting 
opportunities play a key role in the matching process. There is evidence that people tend to 
meet individuals who are like themselves (Kalmijn and Flap, 2001; Nielsen and Svarer, 
2009), and this alone could lead to positive sorting. But even in an environment where 
everyone can potentially meet everyone else, search frictions, combined with aligned 
preferences on the partner’s type, give rise to positive sorting. As shown in Burdett and Coles 
(1997), a class structure will emerge in equilibrium, whereby the optimal strategy is to 
propose to and accept proposals from potential partners only in a fixed type interval. Finally, 
if individuals can choose not only who to propose to and whom to accept proposals from, but 
also where they search (and therefore who they are likely to meet), then segmentation will 
emerge in equilibrium, that is, the marriage market will be segmented in a number of sub-
markets organized around classes of types (Jacquet and Tan, 2007). 
Disentangling all such different channels empirically is challenging, as it is to identify 
whether mating preferences are aligned or assortative. A major problem, in fact, is that 
analysts only observe “final matches” (i.e., marriages and cohabitations), but seldom observe 
the whole pool of potential partners, nor do they have information on the process of proposals 
and rejections that prelude the formation of a relationship. As a result, we are typically unable 
to unravel the separate influence of the forces that underlie this union formation.1 A few 
recent studies, however, shed light on the importance of such mechanisms by examining 
dating choices (e.g., Kurzban and Weeden, 2005; Fisman et al. 2006 and 2008; Finkel, 
Eastwick, and Matthews, 2007; Todd et al., 2007). 
                                                            
1  At the cost of model-specific functional form identifying restrictions, this has been achieved with the 
estimation of structural parameters of marriage (final match) models as in Wong (2003), Bisin, Topa, and 
Verdier (2004), and Choo and Siow (2006). 
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This paper contributes to that new growing literature by using unique data from a 
large commercial speed dating agency in Britain, and makes two substantive contributions. 
First, we provide direct evidence on the nature of the choices underlying mate selection. 
Second, we assess the importance of meeting opportunities relative to that of other forces 
driving dating choices (such as preferences for partners with certain attributes) in explaining 
the observed patterns in dating behavior. Both contributions rely on the fact that we use a 
large sample of speed daters who have a more diverse set of attributes than those analyzed in 
earlier studies. This in itself allows us to focus on an extensive set of dyadic interactions and 
analyze individual patterns of mate choices over several personal characteristics and over 
many events with a wide variation in the composition of the pool of participants across 
events. 
As in earlier speed dating studies, dating preferences can be recovered under the 
assumption that speed daters engage in straightforward behavior (Fisman et al., 2006), that 
is, if whenever a participant proposes to one individual but does not to another, then the flow 
utility value that the participant receives from the former is greater than the corresponding 
value obtained from the latter. 
Given straightforward dating behavior, the speed dating protocol offers considerable 
advantages in comparison to other non-experimental settings. First, it shares some of the key 
useful features of an experimental setup. Subjects meet a large number of potential partners 
in a sequence of short dates that are always organized in the same way: participants meet in 
pairs (a man and a woman), sit at a table, and chat for three minutes.2 This is a compelling 
example of a naturally occurring market as in other field studies (e.g., Harrison and List, 
2004 and 2008): that is, speed daters are not a convenience sample but a population observed 
in a natural environment, without experimental frame. Subjects’ choices in these speed dating 
sessions constitute real behavior with actual consequences. The speed aspect of each dyadic 
meeting ― lasting 3 minutes only ― is a powerful feature here, in line with the huge bulk of 
psychological evidence demonstrating that individuals can make remarkably sophisticated 
social judgements (from mate choice to consumer choice) based on “thin slices” of social 
observations or interactions lasting just a few minutes (e.g., Ambady and Rosenthal, 1992; 
Miller and Todd, 1998; Jones et al., 2007; Finkel, Eastwick, and Matthews, 2007; Finkel and 
Eastwick, 2008; Iyengar, 2009). 
Second, matches are formed via a fully anonymized central process, whereby 
participants report who they wish to meet again to the dating agency and have no limit to the 
number of proposals they can make. The agency, in turn, exchanges contact details only 
between participants who have proposed to each other. This setting therefore offers us 
detailed information on the dyadic choices made by each party as well as whether they form a 
match or not, enabling us to analyze the determinants of mate choices and to underpin the 
process through which matches are formed. Third, mate choices in this context are made at 
the earliest stage of a union, that is, after a first meeting. Since social mixing can only be 
achieved if people choose to engage further with each other after a first encounter, these early 
choices are crucial for our understanding of the formation of long-term partnerships. 
                                                            
2 Throughout the paper, we will refer to “subjects” as the participants making the proposals and to “partners” as 
the participants receiving proposals. 
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Finally, subjects have no prior information about whom they will meet and they can 
propose only after the event. This differs from studies of other forms of mediated dating, such 
as small ads (Lynn and Shurgot, 1984) or on-line dating (Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely, 2010), 
where people choose whom to meet first and, only after, they possibly meet. This process of 
selection is likely to be driven by unverifiable information, which may tend to exaggerate the 
role of attributes believed to be essential in the dating/mating market. Since our goal is to 
study dating choices in an environment where there is no pre-selection on attributes, it is 
important that market participants have no (or little) prior information about each other 
before they meet. 
Our setting, therefore, provides us with a unique source of exogenous variation in 
opportunities (participants choose the venue but do not choose who they meet) and gives us 
the possibility to isolate the role of meeting in mate selection. This is bolstered by the fact 
that we have information on a large number of events (84 in total), and in each of these 
events, we observe several participants (approximately 22 men and 22 women in each event) 
who face exactly the same pool of potential partners (i.e., the same choice set), and we 
observe their choices within this choice set. In addition, the real-life nature of our data is 
important for us to identify the role played by socioeconomic attributes: not only is the 
sample of participants large, but crucially it is also much more diverse than that used in other 
speed dating studies (e.g., Fisman et al., 2006 and 2008). 
Despite such methodological advantages, there may be questions about the external 
validity of our results.3 An argument could be raised on the self-selection of speed daters 
(“who goes speed dating?”). Although this cannot be summarily dismissed, we should stress 
the growing popularity of speed dating events in Britain and elsewhere which gather 
individuals from all walks of life with ample variation in age, socioeconomic position, and 
physical attributes. In Section 3, we will provide detailed information on our estimation 
sample and discuss further the issue of its statistical representativeness. 
Another source of concern is whether the choices made in the speed dating context are 
informative at all about household formation. Speed daters could be driven by strategic 
considerations, such as fear of rejection, by considerations that are not shared by individuals 
who seek to form durable unions. This idea, however, is not strongly supported by the data. 
Indeed, even though there is no limit on the number of proposals that can be made, a 
significant share of participants (38 percent of men and 46 percent of women) do not propose 
to anyone, and only 7 percent propose to more than half of potential partners, while only 1 
percent propose to everyone. These figures support the notion of straightforward behavior 
and are hard to reconcile with the idea that speed daters are primarily interested in short-term 
casual relationships. 
A final related concern has to do with the possibility of multiple equilibria. If some 
speed daters do behave strategically (e.g., they care about the utility from a subsequent 
relationship that may result from the date, or they fear their proposals will be rejected), then 
multiple equilibria can arise. We apply a formal test recently developed by de Paula and Tang 
                                                            
3 Interestingly, Finkel and Eastwick (2008) argue that the speed dating setup exhibit stronger external validity 
than do most of the other highly controlled procedures for analyzing mate selection and romantic attraction. 
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(2011) and find no evidence of multiple equilibria in the data-generating process. Once again, 
this result strongly suggests that our data are likely to reveal speed daters’ preferences. 
Our analysis yields three main findings. First, both women and men value easily 
observable physical attributes: women prefer men who are young and tall, while men are 
more attracted to women who are young and thin. We also find that partner’s education and 
occupation have an impact on desirability, irrespective of gender. Second, there is evidence 
of mild positive assortative preferences (rather than agreed-upon preferences) along a number 
of characteristics, with both women and men preferring partners of similar age, height, and 
education. Third, the impact of dating preferences is limited with meeting opportunities 
playing a more dominant role. This result emphasizes the notion that mating requires 
meeting: the pool of potential partners shapes the type of people whom subjects propose to 
and, ultimately, with whom they form durable relationships.4 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. 
Section 3 introduces the speed dating protocol and describes our data. To gain more insights, 
we also compare our data to other representative data on British singles and document the 
variety of speed daters’ attributes in the sample. In Section 4, we discuss our main findings 
on attribute demands. The aim is to identify the determinants of mate choice and to establish 
whether, even at this early stage, a pattern of positive sorting emerges. We also give evidence 
in support of straightforward behavior and show nonparametric results from the de Paula-
Tang test for the existence of multiple equilibria. Section 5 presents a picture of the patterns 
of dating proposals observed in the aggregate in each speed dating session, providing us with 
evidence on the importance of meeting opportunities. In particular, we analyze how the 
relative abundance of specific attributes in a given market, as opposed to market 
homogeneity, affects mate selection. Section 6 looks at dating matches, that is, cases in which 
individuals propose to each other. Section 7 discusses our main findings emphasizing caveats 
and interpretations, and Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Early studies on human mating date back to Westermarck (1903) and Hamilton 
(1912). The economics literature, which has grown out of Becker’s (1973; 1974; 1981) 
seminal work, has produced search and matching models that can generate wide arrays of 
sorting (e.g., Lam, 1988; Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 1993; Burdett and Coles, 1997; Shimer and 
Smith, 2000; Teulings and Gautier, 2004; Choo and Siow, 2006; Eeckhout, 2006; Smith, 
2006; Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss, 2009; Gautier, Svarer, and Teulings, 2010; Coles and 
Francesconi, 2011).5 The focus of most of these studies however is different from ours, in 
that they try to characterize the conditions under which positive assortative matching may 
arise and explain why matching is assortative. They pursue this goal in a variety of ways by, 
for example, imposing payoff supermodularity and transferable utilities between partners, or 
                                                            
4 Of course, preferences for attributes which we cannot observe (e.g., ethnicity, ambition, and intelligence) may 
still play a substantial role. 
5 Kalmijn (1998), Cooper and Sheldon (2002), Blossfeld and Timm (2003) and Buss (2003) provide broad 
surveys of studies by sociologists and psychologists. 
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allowing for frictions in the matching process with nontransferable utilities, or modeling a 
household production function with spousal trait complementarities. 
 A slightly different issue concerns the nature of mating preferences. This has not yet 
become a central issue in economics, although it is of great salience. Evolutionary 
psychologists and anthropologists argue that individuals prefer those who are similar to 
themselves on relevant dimensions (Berscheid et al., 1971; Thiessen, Young and Delgado, 
1997). For example, similarity of values and tastes gives partners a better chance to 
participate in joint activities, leads to mutual confirmation of each other’s behavior and 
lifestyle, and creates a common basis for conversation and affection (DiMaggio and Mohr, 
1985; Kalmijn 1994). A natural implication of this “likes-attract” mechanism is positive 
marital sorting. Other scientists claim that mate preferences are shared across all individuals 
and primarily reflect traits that are evolutionarily advantageous (Trivers, 1972; Waynforth 
and Dunbar, 1995; Buss, 2003; Buston and Emlen, 2003). People compete with others to 
search for mates with valuable resources. The result of this competition is that the most 
attractive candidates select amongst themselves while the least attractive ones must rely on 
one another. Competition for key resources on the marriage market, therefore, leads again to 
an aggregate pattern of positive assortative mating. 
 A small but burgeoning number of recent studies have analyzed mate selection taking 
advantage of the experimental setting of speed dating. Kurzban and Weeden (2005) use data 
from HurryDate, a large dating company operating in major metropolitan areas in the United 
States, to investigate the choices that approximately 2600 subjects make in dating partners. 
Their main estimates show that female and male subjects have strong agreed-upon 
preferences rather than assortative preferences: they are equally attracted by physically 
observable attributes like weight, height, and age, and much less so by other attributes such as 
education and religion. They also report evidence of small positive assortative patterns along 
race and height.6 
 Within the economics literature, Fisman et al. (2006) base their experimental design 
on the HurryDate format to analyze a sample of about 400 students at Columbia University, 
with the objective of identifying gender differences in dating preferences. Their results 
slightly differ from those found by Kurzban and Weeden (2005). Only men exhibit a 
preference for physical attractiveness while women respond more to intelligence and race. 
They find some evidence of positive sorting, with male subjects valuing women’s 
intelligence or ambition only if it does not exceed their own. They also document the 
importance of group size, whereby women (but not men) become more selective in larger 
meetings. In a subsequent study using the same data, Fisman et al. (2008) investigate racial 
preferences in dating. Their finding that women have stronger racial preferences than men is 
not consistent with the results reported in Kurzban and Weeden (2005). 
 Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely (2010) follow a different approach. They use data from a 
large sample of users of a major on-line dating service in Boston and San Diego to analyze 
how individual characteristics affect the likelihoods of having a personal profile browsed, 
being contacted, and exchanging contact information via e-mail. Although on-line daters do 
                                                            
6 Other noteworthy contributions in the speed dating literature include Todd et al. (2007), Eastwick and Finkel 
(2008), and Lenton, Fasolo, and Todd (2009). 
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not physically meet, this study confirms some of the previous evidence based on speed dating 
and final match data. For example, in line with the results discussed in Fisman et al. (2006), 
Hitsch and colleagues find that women put more weight on a partner’s income than men do; 
and, consistent with Fisman et al. (2008), women have a more pronounced preference to form 
a match with men of their own ethnicity. Finally, Lee (2009) also uses data from an on-line 
dating service in Korea. Her analysis compares sorting as observed in the general population 
to the simulated sorting that arises among daters. She finds more sorting along age and less 
sorting along socioeconomic attributes among daters than among individuals in the general 
population, and argues that on-line dating services may alleviate constraints on people’s 
choice sets. 
 As mentioned earlier, the advantage of speed dating data in comparison to on-line 
dating is that, in on-line dating, part of the selection process occurs before the first actual 
(physical) meeting. People typically browse through profiles and their choices can only 
possibly be based on the information available in these profiles. In a speed dating setting, 
instead, the choices are made after a meeting, and people do not choose whom they will meet 
(they only choose to attend the event). This gives us direct observation on the choice set, and 
enables us to evaluate the role of opportunities directly. 
 Finally, the paper by Nielsen and Svarer (2009) is, to our knowledge, the only study 
that explicitly examines the extent to which opportunities in the marriage market influence 
the tendency of individuals to marry someone who went to the same educational institution or 
to an institution near them. Using Danish administrative data on final matches, they find that 
about half of the systematic sorting on education can be explained by that tendency. They 
attribute this finding to low search frictions or selection of people with similar preferences 
into the same institutions, that is, proximity to partners, which is arguably an important 
component of matching opportunities.7 
 
 
3. Data and Selection Issues 
 
A. The Speed Dating Protocol 
 Speed dating offers single individuals the opportunity to meet a large number of 
potential mates over a short pre-determined period of time. It has become very popular 
among dating agencies, with several commercial companies organizing events in countries 
like the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.8   
 We use data from one of the biggest UK private agencies that operates in small and 
large cities across the country. Participants register for an event that takes place in a specific 
location during the evening in a bar or club. Participants pay a fixed fee, which varies with 
location and occasional discounts. There is no specified maximum number of women and 
                                                            
7 A recent study by Bruze (2011) finds a strong tendency to sort positively on education in marriage among 
movie stars, who typically do not attend the same schools, are not sorted by education in the workplace, and 
whose earnings are not correlated with years of education. Although this result, as Bruze suggests, could be 
exclusively ascribed to preferences, it might be primarily driven by meeting opportunities and the pool of 
available partners movie stars usually interact with. 
8 An updated list of agencies is available at <http://dmoz.org/Society/Relationships/Dating/Speed-Dating>. 
6 
 
men who can participate in each session, although there are rarely more than 30 women and 
30 men. Events are stratified by age (23-35 and 35-50 are typical age ranges) so that 
individuals of roughly the same ages participate in the same session.9 Bookings are made on 
the Internet or, less frequently, by phone. Individuals can book for an event as long as there 
are enough places available. The agency does not screen participants, nor does it intervene in 
the allocation of participants across events. Hence, each event gathers individuals who 
potentially have heterogeneous attributes and are unaware of the people they are about to 
meet. In the next subsection we will return to this last point.10 
 In general, participants arrive for the event and, at registration, are given a starting 
table number, a label tag with a film star alias, and a pen and a card to indicate the alias of the 
people they wish to meet again (we shall refer to this choice as a proposal). Half an hour after 
registration, the host explains how the evening works, and then the session begins. People sit 
at the assigned table, with women usually staying seated at the same table and men moving 
around. Each date lasts for three minutes. After a date, men have about 30 seconds to move to 
the next table, and a new date begins. After eight individual dates the session stops and 
participants can move around and get a quick drink before another round of eight three-
minute dates starts. A typical evening consists of three such rounds, after which participants 
leave. 
 Speed daters communicate their proposals to the agency right after the event. There is 
no limit to the number of proposals subjects can make from the pool of participants. In fact, 
each individual can be matched more than once. The agency collects all these proposals and 
exchanges contact details only between participants who have a match, i.e., those who 
propose to each other.  
Participants are recommended to create a personal profile on the agency’s website 
reporting information on age, education, occupation, basic physical characteristics (weight, 
height, eye color, and hair color), interests (hobbies and activities outside work), smoking 
habits, and family situation (presence of children). This information is self-reported and is not 
verified by the agency in any formal way. Profiles are accessible by all participants after the 
event only, and can be consulted before communicating the proposals. Some characteristics 
in the profile are presumably easier to verify than others. Because participants have already 
personally met, they are likely to have a good idea of each other’s physical appearance. Thus, 
differently from other forms of mediated dating — such as small ads or on-line dating — the 
scope for private information about characteristics that are easily verifiable and might require 
little or no verbal exchange for verification (e.g., age, height, and weight) is arguably limited 
and, quite importantly for our identification purposes, the scope for mis-reporting such salient 
personal characteristics in the on-line profiles is limited too.   
Our estimating sample uses most of the available data drawn from these on-line, self-
reported profiles. Each profile contains information on variables generally believed to be 
                                                            
9 The suggested age range is only a guideline and it is not binding; anyone is free to participate, even outside 
her/his age range. Events with asymmetric age ranges (e.g., women 27-40, men 28-42) are also run occasionally. 
They represent, however, a small proportion of the sessions contained in our data set. 
10 The size of a market may be not fully random because the agency tries to organize events with 20-25 
individuals on each side (profitability and participants’ interest being the main reasons for this target size). This 
information, however, is not known to speed daters. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no meeting had 
to be canceled because of excess or scarcity of participants. 
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salient determinants of mate selection (Buss, 2003). These include cues that can be 
apprehended visually and may not require a verbal exchange for verification, such as age, 
weight, height,11 as well as other traits that could not be easily perceived visually and might 
necessitate a verbal exchange to discern, e.g., educational attainment, occupation, and 
smoking status (Lenton and Francesconi, 2010).  
 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
 We have data on approximately 1800 women and 1800 men who participated in 84 
speed dating events organized between January 2004 and October 2005. Table 1 presents the 
summary statistics of these meetings. The average size of an event is approximately 22 men 
and 22 women. Most events do not have exactly equal numbers of women and men, but the 
difference in numbers rarely goes beyond three. The participation fee across all markets is 
just below £20 per session (the median is £20), and ranges from £10 to £25. About 38 percent 
of men and 46 percent of women do not propose anyone, and three-quarters of the non-
proposing men and almost half of the non-proposing women in the sample go back another 
time. Proposers too go back another time, albeit at a smaller rate on average (about 10 and 20 
percent for women and men, respectively). 
 Striking gender differentials in proposal behavior are observed in the data. In line with 
sexual selection theory (Trivers, 1972; Buss, 2003), women are much choosier than men. On 
average, women select 2.6 men and see 45 percent of their proposals matched, while men 
propose to 5 women and their proposals are matched in only 20 percent of the cases. About 1 
in 3 men and 1 in 10 women do not get any proposal. Overall, we observe 22 matches per 
event, an average of roughly one per participant. To ascertain if participants who do not make 
any proposal are different from those who do, we checked whether the two groups are 
balanced in their distributions of observed characteristics for each gender separately. 
Regardless of subject’s gender, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two groups are 
the same along each of the variables used in our empirical analysis. We repeated this exercise 
for partners, to assess if partners who receive no proposal are different from those who are 
chosen at least once. Again, balance tests on covariates can never be rejected at standard 
levels of statistical significance, irrespective of partner’s gender. 
As already mentioned, our data do not contain information on race or ethnicity. 
However, given that none of the events was aimed at a specific ethnic/religious group and 
with anecdotal corroborative evidence from the agency’s management, the fraction of 
nonwhite participants is small (and most certainly below 5 percent). 
To have a better understanding of speed daters’ characteristics, we compare them to a 
representative sample of singles taken from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).12 
For this comparison, we use information from the fourteenth wave (2004) of the BHPS, and 
restrict the BHPS sample to individuals aged between 20 and 50. 
                                                            
11 The profiles, however, do not contain information on race or ethnic origin. 
12 Since 1991, the BHPS has annually interviewed a representative sample of about 5500 households covering 
more than 10000 individuals. More information on the BHPS can be found at 
<http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps/doc/>. 
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Summary statistics by sample are reported in Table 2. 13  The differences across 
samples are notable. Speed dating participants are more educated on average (about two 
thirds of men and women have at least a university degree, against 20 percent of singles in 
the BHPS), and are more concentrated in relatively high-skilled occupations (83 percent of 
men and 76 percent of women are in ‘skilled non-manual’ and ‘professional and managerial’ 
jobs, as opposed to 40 percent in the BHPS). Our sample therefore fits the popular view about 
speed dating markets, according to which they seem to attract a disproportionate fraction of 
career people (Kurzban and Weeden, 2005). 
Speed daters are also older than their BHPS counterparts (especially men, who are 5 
years older on average). But if we restrict the BHPS sample to individuals with at least a 
university degree, the age differentials are reversed: male and female speed daters are 1 to 4 
years younger, respectively. The average height is similar in both samples, slightly below 180 
centimeters for men and around 165 centimeters for women. The average weight is 
comparable among men in the two samples, but it is much lower for female speed daters, and 
this difference does not disappear even if the BHPS sample is restricted to highly educated 
women. Dividing weight (measured in kilograms) by height squared (measured in meters), 
we obtain the Body Mass Index (BMI), which we include in our empirical analysis. General 
health guidelines associate ‘normal’ weight with a BMI between 18.5 and 25, and define 
‘underweight’ when BMI is below 18.5 and ‘overweight’ when BMI is above 25. The shares 
of overweight men and, in particular, women are substantially larger in the BHPS sample 
than in the speed dating sample. The two sets of figures do not get closer even when the 
BHPS sample is restricted to more educated respondents. 
It is worthwhile noting that in the speed dating sample there are substantially fewer 
women reporting weight information than men. Our demand analysis in Section 4 will try to 
minimize the resulting loss in sample size by assigning participants with missing weight 
information to the (base) normal weight category and identifying them with a missing weight 
dummy variable.14 We shall proceed in a similar fashion for all the variables with missing 
information (except age, because we restrict the sample to individuals with valid age data). 
Alternative assignment rules (e.g., substituting missing values with market mean or modal 
values computed on valid cases) have delivered exactly identical results to those discussed 
below and are, therefore, not reported. However, we will discuss the estimates for the dummy 
variables that record missing information. 
Finally, smoking is more prevalent among BHPS respondents, with 36 percent of men 
and 38 percent of women smoking against 9 and 13 percent respectively in the speed dating 
sample. Limiting the BHPS sample to highly educated individuals does not eliminate the 
differences but reduces them by more than half. Speed daters are therefore healthier than their 
                                                            
13 The categorizations of the variables in Table 2 and used in the analysis below are standard. Some, such as 
education and occupation, have been motivated by data availability. Redefining, for example, education 
(occupation) so that lower educational qualifications (other occupational groups) are explicitly considered 
would only lead to small cell size problems without adding new insights to our goal of understanding mate 
choice decisions.  
14 There might be a concern that those not reporting their weight information are overweight or obese. Thus, we 
also reclassified participants with missing information into the overweight (rather than the normal weight) 
category. This alternative classification did not alter any of the results shown in the next sections.  
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BHPS counterparts. Alternatively, they may believe that smoking reduces their overall 
desirability and, consequently, are more likely to misreport smoking information. 
In sum, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate that, relative to the overall British 
population, speed daters are different along a number of salient characteristics, such as 
education, occupation, and weight. We cannot rule out the possibility that the decision to 
participate in speed dating events might signal a desire to meet people with such attributes 
and individuals might self-select on the basis of these attributes. In Section 4 we will come 
back to this issue and examine it more formally assessing how it might affect our 
interpretation of the role of preferences in mate selection.  
Despite the sample selection issue, our analysis does not suffer from the “articulation 
effect” mentioned in Fisman et al. (2006). This emerges when subjects are asked to rank their 
partners on particular attributes at the same time as they propose to them. In such cases, it is 
possible that the proposal decision is affected by the reasoning on which the rating itself is 
determined. Because in our data set subjects do not have to articulate reasons for their 
proposals and are never asked to rate partners (other than choosing them), the results below 
should not be driven by reason-based choice. 
We have already mentioned that an attractive feature of the speed dating protocol is 
that no one has prior information about who will be attending an event. Events are filled up 
on a first-come/first-served basis, that is, the agency does not screen participants ex ante. But 
we cannot rule out the possibility that the choice set faced by speed daters may not be entirely 
exogenous to their preferences. If this were the case, we should observe a systematic (non-
zero) correlation in female and male characteristics across sessions with the odds of meeting 
partners with similar attributes being greater than the odds of meeting partners with non-
similar attributes. Admittedly, the coefficients of variation reported in Table 2 (in italics) 
provide evidence of a lower degree of dispersion in the speed dating sample than in the 
general population of singles along most of the observed characteristics, especially education 
and higher-level occupations. But we do not find significant differences in terms of other 
attributes, including age, height and weight. 
To provide additional evidence, Figure 1 plots the distribution of female and male 
characteristics (means for age and height, and shares for the other attributes) across sessions. 
It shows a fairly widespread distribution of participants along all traits, except for age, which 
is not surprising. This is broadly confirmed by the correlation estimates reported in the first 
column of Table 3. Apart from age and smoking, the correlation between female and male 
attributes is close to zero and not significant. The second column of Table 3 reports odds 
ratios for all the female-male pairs in our sample. Contrary to the correlation results, the odds 
of meeting a similar partner are slightly (but significantly) greater than those of meeting a 
non-similar partner for almost all attributes, with the exception of occupation and weight. 
Despite this result, such odd ratios are very close to one and much lower than those generally 
found for women and men in final matches (e.g., Mare, 1991; Kalmijn, 1994; Pencavel, 
1998). We, therefore, take these results as evidence of only mild sorting ex ante. We shall 
return to the potential of non-random selection in the next sections. 
 
 
10 
 
4. Individual Dating Proposals 
 
We now estimate attribute demands looking at the whole set of proposals a subject 
can make in a given market and examining which of the potential partner’s observed 
attributes trigger a proposal. At this stage, we remain agnostic on the mechanisms that might 
drive such proposals, in particular whether they reveal specific mating preferences or 
strategic considerations. Later in the section, we will come back to this issue. 
 
A. Baseline Estimates 
 We begin by investigating the association of partner’s attributes with the probability 
  re ssion specification is of the form of making a proposal. Our basic gre
 
ሺ1ሻ        ݀௜௝௠ ൌ ܆௝௠
ᇱ ߚ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௝௠,      
 
where ݀௜௝௠ is the proposal decision that subject i takes with respect to partner j in market m. 
This is equal to one if i proposes to j, and zero otherwise. The vector ܆௝௠ contains socio-
demographic characteristics of potential partners in market m, ߤ௜  is a subject-specific 
permanent fixed effect, and ߝ௜௝௠  is an idiosyncratic shock. For ease of interpretation, we 
estimate (1) using linear probability models with subject fixed effects. Qualitatively similar 
results were obtained using least squares regression and random effects models, which are 
therefore not reported. 
The estimates by subject’s gender are shown in the first two columns of Table 4.15 
The last column reports the results of the test of equality of coefficients by gender. All 
attributes, with the exception of height and missing smoking status, appear to affect 
desirability differently for men and women. A notable result is that partner’s attributes 
explain relatively little (between 3 and 7 percent) of the overall variation in proposals. This 
does not mean that preferences can have only a minor effect on mate selection: it is well 
established, in fact, that even mild preferences for certain attributes may lead to high levels of 
segregation (Schelling, 1971). This is an important point to which we will return in Section 5. 
 More educated women are more desirable than less educated women: on average, 
they are 2 percentage points more likely to receive a proposal. There is no evidence, however, 
of a similar pattern on the other side of the market (i.e., in the case of women’s demand). 
Occupational status affects partner’s demand considerably more than education, and 
influences desirability in opposite directions for men and women. Women in skilled and 
managerial or professional occupations are less likely to receive a proposal than others, while 
the opposite pattern emerges for men.  
 Physically observable attributes also have an effect on desirability. Both men and 
women are more likely to receive proposals if they are young and tall. Weight on the other 
                                                            
15 In the analysis below, we enter age (in years), height and weight linearly. Height and weight are normalised 
by subtracting the corresponding sample mean and dividing by the corresponding standard deviation. In 
addition, Table 4 distinguishes individuals with degree or higher qualifications, includes three occupational 
dummies and a dummy for smoking status. We experimented with several other specifications (e.g., 
polynomials in age, height, and weight, and different dummy variables for education and occupation) and also 
included measures of BMI. All our main results remained unchanged.  
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hand affects desirability differently for men and women. While it is a disadvantage for 
women, it is an advantage for men. This is consistent with earlier findings in the psychology 
and evolutionary biology literatures (e.g., Tovée et al., 1998; Thornhill and Grammar, 1999; 
Buss, 2003). If a woman smokes, her likelihood of receiving a proposal is reduced by 4 
percentage points, and, if a man does, his likelihood goes down by about 1.5 percentage 
points. 
 The analysis also includes indicator variables for missing information on partner’s 
characteristics. Since participants create and post their own online profiles, those who do not 
report such information might seek not to disclose less desirable attributes. As discussed 
earlier, the incentive to misreport (or not report at all) information is likely to be limited, 
because speed daters can consult profiles only after they have physically met. The estimates 
in Table 4 show no clear evidence that participants who do not report information are less 
desirable. The largest estimates are found for missing occupation information which reduces 
women’s desirability by about 12 percentage points and increases men’s by almost 5 
percentage points.  
 It is worth stressing that socioeconomic status and physical attributes are correlated in 
our sample. For male subjects, education and occupation are strongly positively correlated 
with both own age and height. For female subjects, instead, we find that height and weight 
are correlated with neither own education nor occupation, but age is negatively related to 
higher educational attainment. Regardless of gender, smoking is negatively associated with 
both education and occupation. When formulating their proposals, therefore, individuals (and, 
in our data, women especially) may be using partners’ desirable physical attributes, such as 
height and age, as strong predictors of socioeconomic position, as suggested by the matching 
theory based on costly signals developed by Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009). 
 
B. Are Dating Choices Assortative? 
To gain a further insight into the way individuals formulate their mate choices, we 
extend our previous analysis by taking subjects’ own traits into account, and examine if 
subjects propose to partners who are similar to themselves rather than to partners with 
different attributes. Specifically, we estimate the influence of subjects’ characteristics on their 
own demand for partners. This concordance analysis is theoretically motivated by many of 
the studies that show striking similarities between mates along several dimensions, such as 
age, education and physical appearance (e.g., Schwartz and Mare, 2005; Kurzban and 
Weeden, 2005; Choo and Siow, 2006; Nielsen and Svarer, 2009; Bruze, 2011). The demand 
framework analysis used in the previous subsection still yields an appropriate interpretation 
of the relationships of interest, provided the assumption of straightforward behavior continues 
to hold.  
We augment model (1) with partner’s fixed effects and with concordance variables,16 
that is, we identify the effects of concordance variables controlling for subject and partner’s 
                                                            
16 For this analysis, we use differences in age and height between men and women. In particular, we distinguish 
pairs in which the man is 7 centimeters taller from other pairs. Although this cutoff is arbitrary, 7 centimeters 
correspond to one standard deviation in the height distribution of married men and women aged 20-50 in the 
2004 BHPS. Seven centimeters are also about half of the gender height difference among married couples. 
Similar considerations apply to the case of age, for which we distinguish men who are 5 or more years older 
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individual attributes. The results by subject’s gender are reported in Table 5. The first two 
columns present a specification with concordance variables indicating whether subject and 
potential partner share similar or identical cues. The last two columns show the results from a 
more flexible specification, which allows for differences in the way heterogamy may affect 
mate choice (e.g., whether the subject is more or less educated than the partner) and breaks 
down different types of concordance (e.g., both subject and partner smoke or both do not 
smoke). Compared to the results shown in Table 4, we obtain a considerably greater R2 in all 
specifications, suggesting that the inclusion of partner-specific fixed effects enhances the 
model’s ability to capture the overall variation in proposals.  
We find evidence of positive sorting along age. Both men and women prefer dates 
where he is up to 5 years older rather than dates where he is more than 5 years older or where 
the man is younger than the woman. Mate desirability is also influenced by educational 
homogamy (Nielsen and Svarer, 2009): partners with similar educational levels are 2 
percentage points more likely to receive a proposal than partners whose qualifications are 
different. Women reveal positive assortative preferences on smoking and men on height, with 
both men and women disliking dates in which the woman is taller. There is instead no 
evidence of concordance on occupation or BMI. In fact, a man is substantially less likely to 
propose to a woman if both of them are students or self-employed.  
An important determinant of mate choice decisions, which we have ignored so far, is 
the variation in the choice set faced by subjects within each session. This will be the focus of 
the next section. A related determinant is the choice set variation across sections, as given by 
event size. Including event size (number of partners) as an additional regressor in (1) does not 
change any of our results, with the event size estimates being always small and statistically 
insignificant. 
In Section 3, we pointed out that speed daters differ from singles from the general 
population along a number of salient characteristics. We also mentioned the possibility that 
the decision to participate in speed dating events might signal a desire to meet people with 
such attributes and individuals might self-select on the basis of these attributes.  
This implies that preference for positive sorting might play a greater role than what 
we have claimed so far. In the same section, however, we also argued that speed daters’ 
unawareness about other participants (and their characteristics) cannot trigger the desire to 
meet people with similar traits, unless they return to future events expecting to meet partners 
with exactly the same attributes.17 Consider the case of education, for which speed daters in 
our sample are substantially more educated than individuals from the general population. If 
speed daters know they are likely to meet highly educated participants and have a penchant 
for education, then it is possible that preferences play a role that we have not accounted for. 
Interestingly, our results show evidence of only mild preferences for higher educated partners 
on either side of the market. This observation could be extended to all other attributes 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
than women. Therefore, although the construction of such concordance measures is primarily based on the 
empirical distributions of male-female attribute differences within our sample, their interpretation is meaningful 
and justifiable within both the mate selection literature more generally (Trivers, 1972; Miller and Todd, 1998; 
Buss, 2003; Buston and Emlen, 2003; Lenton et al., 2009) and the assortative mating literature more specifically 
(Hout, 1982; Mare, 1991; Kalmijn, 1998; Kurzban and Weeden, 2005; Nielsen and Svarer, 2009). Several 
robustness checks of such measures have yielded comparable results to those reported here. 
17 In Section 5.A we shall examine the role played by returning speed daters on our results. 
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considered in the analysis. It seems unlikely, therefore, that our estimates systematically bias 
the role played by preferences. 
 
C. Preferences or Strategic Concerns? 
 An important question arising from the previous analysis regards the interpretation of 
the mechanisms driving dating proposals. In fact, although agreed-upon preferences are 
unlikely to play a dominant role, proposals might be driven not just by (assortative) 
preferences but also by strategic considerations (i.e., anticipation of rejection). Specifically, 
choices could be assortative either because speed daters have preferences for partners with 
similar attributes or because they have strategic concerns. For example, a low-education 
woman may be more likely to propose to a low-education man not because she prefers a 
partner with similar education to hers, but because she anticipates that she will not be chosen 
by a man with greater levels of education.18  
 As already emphasized, the room for strategic incentives in the way in which speed 
daters express their preferences is likely to be limited in our setting. First, proposals are made 
online and require only a tick of an anonymous (alias) name. Second, there is no limit to the 
number of proposals that can be made. Third, if a proposal is not reciprocated (i.e., it is not 
matched), the rejection goes through a third party (the speed dating agency) rather than on a 
face-to-face basis, and participants are unlikely to meet again. Thus, both the cost of 
proposing and the fear of rejection are arguably negligible at this early stage of the process 
and in our speed dating setup, and these in turn should reduce the scope for strategic 
considerations. 
 If variation in the quality of subjects in a given market m leads them to make different 
choices, then this may be indicative of strategic choice behavior. For example, participants 
with relative attractiveness concerns may anticipate to be rejected in markets where they are 
relatively less attractive than their competitors. To test for this possibility, we augmented (1) 
with the vector ቀ܆௜ െ ܆௜
ሺ௦ሻ
ቁ, where each ܺ௜
ሺ௦ሻ
 denotes the mean of attribute X computed over 
all subjects in a given market m. If there is no strategic behavior of this kind, we expect the 
new estimated coefficients on all differences to be zero. All such estimates (not shown for 
convenience) are not statistically different from zero, with the lowest p-values on age being 
equal to 0.174 for female subjects and 0.143 for male subjects, and with p-values of the F-test 
of joint significance being 0.448 and 0.403 for women and men, respectively. These results 
suggest no role of strategic choice behavior among subjects, in the sense that proposal 
decisions do not seem to be driven by subjects’ relative attractiveness concerns. 
 A further way of gauging the salience of strategic incentives is by looking at 
unmatched proposals.19 By definition, a proposal is successful only if it is matched. If speed 
daters are strategic and their proposal behavior is driven by the anticipation of who will reject 
them, we should find that the correlation between proposals is positive and that the proportion 
of proposals being matched is substantial. In events with a large fraction of ‘reject-averse’ 
                                                            
18 Notice however that, from a policy perspective this distinction is unimportant when the role of preferences (or 
strategic considerations) is evaluated against the role of meeting opportunities. See Section 5. 
19 It is worth reminding that, on the basis of the homogeneity tests discussed in the earlier section, speed daters 
who do not make (receive) any proposal are not statistically different from those who do, along each of the 
attributes included in our analysis. 
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individuals, therefore, participants may be reluctant to propose to partners who are believed 
to be less likely to reciprocate their proposal, simply because they do not wish to be turned 
down and not because such partners are not desirable. As documented in Section 3, men 
propose to an average of five women per session and women propose to an average of two 
men; the small number of male proposals is matched in only 20 percent of the cases, while 
the even smaller number of female proposals is matched in 38 percent of the cases. As a 
result, the overall correlation between proposals is positive but small (less than 0.15). This 
evidence supports the notion of straightforward behavior formalized by Fisman et al. (2006), 
on which the identification of preferences in a speed dating setup rests. 
 Finally, realizing that individuals might not engage in straightforward behavior if, for 
example, they care about the utility from a subsequent relationship that may result from the 
date (what Fisman et al. [2006] call match utility) or if they do not propose because of the 
fear their proposal will not be reciprocated, we perform a test for the existence of multiple 
equilibria in the data-generating process. In particular, we use the nonparametric test 
formulated by de Paula and Tang (2011). Table 6 presents the covariance of the male and 
female proposals (i.e., the only test statistic in a two-player game), its bootstrap standard 
error, the test results obtained from Wald statistics, and the number of games. Both 
unconditionally and conditional on event size, we can never reject the null hypothesis of a 
unique equilibrium. These estimates provide strong evidence in support of the idea that the 
behavior of speed daters in our sample is unlikely to be driven by strategic considerations, 
match utility, or fear of rejection. They strongly suggest instead that speed daters’ behavior is 
straightforward and hence choices, even at this early stage of the meeting process, are likely 
to reveal participants’ dating preferences. 
 
 
5. The Role of the Market 
 
The estimates of the previous section offer evidence in favor of positive sorting along 
a number of individual attributes. These same attributes, however, can explain only a small 
fraction of the overall variation in dating proposals. The goal of this section is to describe the 
aggregate patterns of proposals arising at the event (or “market”) level. As mentioned 
already, an important advantage of our data is that they have information on several events 
and, for each event, on both sides of the market in which individuals propose to each other. 
In what follows we analyze two salient dimensions along which markets may vary: 
the first is the abundance (or scarcity) of desirable attributes, and the second is the degree of 
homogeneity among potential partners. For example, in some markets there may be an 
abundance of university graduates on both sides, while in others university graduates might 
be short in numbers. Alternatively, some sessions could be highly heterogeneous, with 
substantially more university graduates on one side than the other. Although both dimensions 
could have a significant impact on dating proposal behavior, we know little about this 
influence. 
 
 
15 
 
A. Relative Abundance of Attributes and Aggregate Proposals 
We start by presenting a simple conceptual framework which guides our empirical 
analysis and the interpretation of the results. We have information on 84 events, each of them 
involving two pools of potential partners, one on each side of the market. Consider a specific 
speed dating event, m (m=1,...,84). Although, the full choice set is the product of distributions 
of all the observable attributes of all potential partners in m, we focus for simplicity on one 
attribute at the time, denoted by X, and represent the distribution of X over partners by its 
mean, ܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻ
. For each m, we also observe the mean attribute of all partners who have been 
proposed to, which we refer to as the proposal set  ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
.20 
Suppose dating proposals are exclusively formulated on the basis of meeting 
opportunities, that is, subjects have no intrinsic preferences for any specific attribute. In this 
environment, the mean attribute of partners who have been proposed to in market m will have 
to be equal to the mean attribute of all potential partners in m, that is, ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
ൌ ܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻ
. For 
instance, the share of highly educated women who have been proposed to by every man in a 
given event should be equal to the share of highly educated women in that same event. Put 
differently, in a scatter plot of ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
 against ܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻ
, we would expect the data points to be 
scattered along the 45-degree line. This is what we refer to as the “opportunity-only” (O-O) 
model, whose empirical counterpart corresponds to the following constrained regression: 
 
ሺ2ሻ        ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
ൌ ܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻ
൅ ݑ௠,     
 
where ݑ௠ is an idiosyncratic shock to market m. If there is a commonly-shared preference for 
X, then we will observe ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
൐ ܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻ
 (i.e., in the scatter plot, ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
 will lie above the 45-degree 
line), and if there is a commonly-shared distaste, ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
൏ ܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻ
 (i.e., ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
 will lie below the 45-
degree line). Such possibilities imply that (2) becomes: 
 
ሺ3ሻ        ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻ
൅ ݑ௠,     
 
with the O-O mo or spon
 
ሺ4ሻ        ߙ଴ ൌ 0  and   ߙଵ ൌ 1. 
del c re ding to the constrained version of (3) in which 
 
The equalities in (4) provide the necessary and sufficient statistical conditions under 
which meeting opportunities determine sorting. An identification caveat, as it is always the 
case in matching markets (e.g., Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010), is that this test effectively 
amounts to testing a mixture of preferences and opportunities, since the estimates of both 
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20  By definition, and regardless of whether X is binary or continuous, ܺ௠ ൌ ൫∑ ௝ܺ௠
௃೘
௝ୀଵ ൯/ܬ௠  and ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
ൌ
൬∑ ௝ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ௃೘
ሺ೎ሻ
௝ୀଵ ൰ /ܬ௠
ሺ௖ሻ,  where j indexes partners, ܬ௠ is the total number of potential (other-sex) partners in market m, 
and ܬ௠
ሺ௖ሻ is the number of partners who receive a proposal in market m. 
ߙ଴  and ߙଵ might pick up behavior and event heterogeneity (such as within-market 
idiosyncratic preference polarization and event size variation) and noise (such as 
measurement error) correlated to ݑ௠. As in other studies (e.g., Gautier, Svarer, and Teulings, 
2010; Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny, 2010), we address this caveat by performing a 
number of robustness checks and resting on our large samples within each market. 
Nonetheless, the possibility that our estimates identify a mixture of opportunities and 
preferences and not just opportunities remains, and caution should be used in the 
interpretation of the results.  
For each of the attributes used so far, panel A of Table 7 reports the results from 
regressions (3) by subject’s gender. To ease interpretation, the estimates are complemented 
by Figures 2 and 3, which plot  ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
 against  ܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻ
. The aggregate picture reveals some 
striking patterns that guide the interpretation of our estimates. The O-O model cannot be 
rejected in eight out of the 12 attribute-proposal patterns analyzed here, while it can be 
rejected in the case of age (for both male and female proposals), smoking (female proposals) 
and education (male proposals). All estimates are robust to the inclusion of event size in (3). 
Consider the four cases in which the O-O model is rejected. In line with our earlier 
analysis, younger partners (regardless of gender), more educated women, and men who do 
not smoke tend to receive more proposals on average. Interestingly, in each of these cases, 
there is a switch in the aggregate proposal pattern depending on whether the attribute is 
abundant or not at the market level. The tendency to propose to participants who are younger 
than the average in a given session is weaker in events in which there is an abundance of 
older-than-average partners, despite the fact that speed daters generally prefer younger 
partners. Similarly, the propensity to propose to men who are not smoking decreases when 
there are more male smokers present in the market. The scarcity of a desirable attribute 
(young age and nonsmoking) reduces its desirability, rather than heightening its demand. This 
cannot be easily interpreted on the basis of preferences only without resorting to 
opportunities. The opposite pattern is observed in the case of female education. Although 
women who are highly educated tend to be less popular than the average woman in sessions 
where there are only few of them, they become more desirable in markets where there are 
more of them. 
The education estimates allow us to reconsider the issue of sample selection which 
was previously discussed in Sections 3 and 4. Speed daters are more educated than 
individuals from the population at large. If they know this and they wish to date highly 
educated people, the matching process we estimate at the event level should be driven by 
preferences to a large extent. If this is the mechanism underlying the proposal behavior under 
study, then the slope parameter for education should be greater than unity. In Table 7, this 
emerges only for female subjects, although ߙଵ is not statistically significantly different from 
one. In the case of male subjects, instead, we find exactly the opposite. Like in the analysis of 
individual demands, this evidence is thus hard to reconcile with the notion of a greater role 
for preferences in matching. 
Dating proposals, therefore, cannot be assumed to be just a function of potential 
partners’ characteristics. The environment in which potential partners meet matters and 
shapes proposal behavior considerably, albeit the O-O model is statistically rejected in such 
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cases. It is worth stressing this point because market information is generally unavailable, 
even when on-line dating data are used, and, by leaving the market out of the analysis, we are 
likely to obtain an incomplete picture of mate choice decisions. 
Along the other attribute-proposal combinations, the O-O model cannot be rejected: 
that is, observed proposals appear to be driven primarily by meeting opportunities. Such 
combinations refer to occupation, height, and weight for both women and men, education in 
the case of female proposals, and smoking in the case of male proposals. In these instances, 
the intercept ߙ଴  is always equal to zero, and the slope parameter ߙଵ  is never statistically 
different from 1. These results, even accounting for the identification caveat raised earlier, 
suggest that meeting opportunities are likely to play an essential role in shaping the observed 
pattern of mate choice in our sample. 
In the previous section, we mentioned the potential issues raised by individuals who 
participate to more than one event. To assess the influence of ‘returning’ speed daters on our 
results more formally, we re-computed the statistics needed to test the O-O model after 
excluding individuals who were observed in more than one event. The estimates from this 
new exercise were very close to those shown in Table 7.  
Our analysis so far has assumed that proposals are determined only by partners’ 
characteristics and attribute distributions. Of course, they may be influenced also by subjects’ 
characteristics and distributions. For example, highly educated women may receive a larger 
share of proposals in sessions with a greater concentration of highly educated male subjects; 
and, conversely, they may receive a smaller share of proposals when the pool of subjects is 
relatively less educated. 
To explore this possibility and provide a further robustness check of our results, we 
analyze a relationship similar to equation (3) in which, on the right-hand side, ܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻ
 is 
replaced with the observed mean of X computed over all subjects in m,  ܺ௠
ሺ௦ሻ
, that is: 
 
ሺ5ሻ        ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻ
൅ ߥ௠.     
 
The idea here is that if, given m and X, subjects’ proposal behavior, summarized by  ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ
, is 
independent of subjects’ own attribute distribution, captured by  ܺ௠
ሺ௦ሻ
, (or, in other words, 
ߚଵ ൌ 0), then dating proposals are expected to be shaped mainly by market conditions.
21 
The results are in panel B of Table 7. Except for the cases of age and smoking, the 
distribution of subjects’ attributes turns out to be uncorrelated to subjects’ demands. This 
means that, in our speed dating context, subjects’ characteristics do not influence subjects’ 
proposals (who they propose to).  
Proposals, therefore, continue to be largely determined by the opportunities of 
meeting specific partners with specific attributes. 
                                                            
21 In Section 4.C, we examined subjects’ relative attractiveness concerns in standard attribute demands by 
including the difference between a subject’s attribute and the market level mean of the same attribute computed 
over all subjects. The exercise here is different, not only because it focuses on market level (rather than 
individual level) behavior, but also because it considers the effect of subjects’ average traits on subjects’ choice 
set rather than the effect of deviations from subjects’ mean characteristics on the individual likelihood of 
making a proposal.  
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B. Market Homogeneity and Sorting 
Other than with respect to the relative abundance of attributes, markets may also vary 
in their degree of homogeneity, whereby sessions could comprise more or fewer individuals 
with similar attributes. To gauge how market homogeneity influences the distribution of 
proposals, our analysis here follows that performed in the previous section, although now it 
focuses on changes in the degree of partner homogeneity across markets, which is defined as 
the fraction of pairs of potential partners in a given session who share a specific attribute.22 If 
dating proposals are exclusively formulated on the basis of meeting opportunities, that is, 
subjects have no intrinsic preferences for partners with a similar attribute, the share of 
partners who have been proposed to in market m will have to be equal to the share of 
potential partners in the same market m. We keep the same notation as before, but now 
෨ܺ  refers to the fraction of partners sharing an identical attribute. In such an environment, the 
O-O model corresponds to the following constrained regression: 
 
ሺ6ሻ        ෨ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ ൌ ෨ܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻ ൅ ߦ௠,     
 
where ߦ௠  is an idiosyncratic shock to market m. Again, if there is a commonly-shared 
preference for similarity along X or if there is a commonly-shared distaste, we will observe 
 ෨ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ to be either greater or smaller than ෨ܺ௠, respectively. To allow for this possibility, we 
then estimate 
 
ሺ7ሻ        ෨ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵ ෨ܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻ ൅ ߦ௠, 
 
with the O-O model corresponding to the constrained version of (7) in which ߛ଴ ൌ 0 and 
ߛଵ ൌ 1. The same caveat about this test as the one raised earlier, i.e., that it amounts to testing 
a mixture of preferences and opportunities rather than the O-O m del per se, pplies again. o a
 For each attribute, Table 8 reports the results from regressions (7) by subject’s gender. 
These estimates are supported by Figures 4 and 5, which plot  ෨ܺ௠
ሺ௖ሻ against ෨ܺ௠
ሺ௣ሻfor male and 
female subjects, respectively. The O-O model is rejected in 6 out of the 12 cases at standard 
levels of statistical significance. These are age and height regardless of the subject’s gender, 
BMI for male subjects, and smoking for female subjects. 
 The fact that (6) can never be rejected in the case of education and occupation 
indicates that sorting in proposal behavior along such characteristics is likely to be mild. 
Evidence of negative sorting instead emerges along height (especially among women) and 
BMI (especially among men), while positive sorting is found in the case of age and smoking. 
This evidence, combined with the identification caveat discussed above, is indicative of the 
importance of sorting preferences in mate choice decisions. A visual inspection of Figure 4, 
however, suggests that, with the exception of age and height, the aggregate patterns of 
proposals closely replicate the distributions of market characteristics, confirming what we 
found earlier when analyzing the aggregate relative abundance of attributes. 
                                                            
22 For most events in our sample, we observe between 400 and 900 of such pairs. 
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6. From Proposals to Matches 
 
Because our data contain information on proposals made from both sides of the 
market, we can gain further insights on the nature of the matches arising after a first 
encounter. A natural question, in fact, is to ask whether greater positive sorting is found when 
we observe a match, that is, when two people propose to each other. 
Repeating the analysis reported in Section 3, we compute attribute odds ratios for the 
female-male pairs for which there is a match. To ease our exposition, these estimates are 
presented in Table 3, close to the corresponding odds ratios computed on all female-male 
meetings. The odds of getting matched to a partner of similar age are 11 times greater than 
those of getting matched to a partner of different age, which represents an almost five-fold 
statistically significant increase with respect to the corresponding odds ratio computed on all 
speed daters. The odds ratios for matched pairs on the other attributes increase too, and, as 
indicated by the last column of the table, this increase is significant in the cases of education 
and occupation. But the magnitude of such odds ratios is always modest, especially if 
compared to the estimates found with final match data (Mare, 1991; Kalmjin, 1994 and 1998; 
Pencavel, 1998; Schwartz and Mare, 2005). Thus, preferences (in particular, on age and 
education) influence match formation in this environment, but much less than what we 
observe amongst partners in cohabiting or marital unions in standard survey or census data. 
Again, meeting opportunities seem to have an important role among speed daters and, 
perhaps more generally, at the early stages of all relationships. 
In Section 4, we mentioned some results of assortative preferences along a measure of 
agreed-upon popularity, a proxy of potential partners’ consensual value (see footnote 16). To 
provide further evidence of how such preferences operate in mate choice and partnership 
formation, we estimated odds ratios on the whole sample of female-male pairs and on the 
subsample of pairs for which there is a match using such a measure. The odds ratio increases 
from about 1 (t-value=0.8) in the former sample to 4.7 (t-value=10.4) in the latter, suggesting 
that a highly popular individual is almost 5 times more likely to get a date with another 
highly popular mate than with a less popular individual. Not only are popular individuals 
more likely to receive proposals and propose to each other, but they are also more likely to 
get a date with one another. Assortative preferences therefore may trigger this positive sorting 
on market value, but the measure itself reveals again the importance of the market within 
which it is determined. 
 
 
7. Discussion 
 
The previous section has documented one important new result: proposals and dating 
matches alike are determined to a large extent by meeting opportunities in the (dating) 
market. Although mate selection and final matches are undoubtedly affected by individual 
preferences over partners’ attributes, their overall import at this early stage is relatively 
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modest giving way to the role of market opportunities. This indicates that dating and mating 
require meeting: the pool of available interaction partners is shaped by various institutionally 
organized arrangements (e.g., schools, work places, neighborhoods, family networks, 
voluntary associations, bars and clubs) and these constrain the type of people with whom we 
form personal relationships and eventually durable unions. 
The importance of the environment in which individuals choose their partners and 
friends has been already stressed in earlier studies in different contexts (e.g., Bisin, Topa, and 
Verdier, 2004; Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2006; Nielsen and Svarer, 2009).23 Our results add 
to such contributions and have ramifications for our understanding of social structure and 
socioeconomic mobility. They also provide us with fresh underpinnings to interpret the 
existing evidence on mate choice highlighted in the speed dating context (Kurzban and 
Weeden, 2005; Fisman et al., 2006 and 2008; Todd et al. 2007) or in other mediated and 
unmediated environments (Plomin, DeFries, and Roberts, 1977; Lynn and Shurgot, 1984; 
DiMaggio and Mohr, 1985; Wong, 2003; Choo and Siow, 2006; Lenton, Fasolo, and Todd, 
2008; Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely, 2010). Even in settings in which the amount of positive 
assortative matching is considerable (such as in final matches), the pool of available partners 
is likely to be salient. This suggests a continued emphasis not on assortment, but rather on 
identifying institutional and social milieux where people meet and mate as well as 
formulating a more precise definition of marriage markets (Pawłowski and Dunbar, 1999). 
Put differently, our result calls us to pay attention to the “how” ― and not just the ‘who’ ― 
of mate selection, as some evolutionary anthropologists and psychologists have also begun to 
stress (Miller and Todd, 1998). 
We have long known that the chances to marry endogamously are higher the more 
often one meets people within the “group” (however this is defined) and the more often one 
interacts with group members on a day-to-day basis (see, among others, Kalmijn [1998]). 
Stone (1977) offers a fascinating account of the development of a series of county marriage 
markets, centered on the facilities of county towns (such as balls, card parties, annual fairs, 
and horse-racing events), and a national marriage market, centered on London and Bath, for 
the British aristocracy during the first half of the eighteenth century. Despite this, our 
knowledge of marriage markets is rather patchy and anecdotal. In fact, the operationalization 
of the very notion of marriage markets is challenging. 
Economists have typically studied specific aspects of the number of women and men 
in a reference population, such as sex ratios among immigrants or ethnic groups or after 
events (such as wars) that lead to exogenous sex ratio changes (e.g., Chiappori, Fortin, and 
Lacroix, 2002; Angrist, 2002; Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle, 2004; Abramitzky, Delavande, 
and Vasconcelos, 2011). But this can offer only a coarse view of the institutional mechanisms 
by which the courting process comes about. A well established strand of sociological research 
has focused on the geographic distribution of ethnic groups, such as Asian-Americans in 
California or Jewish-Americans in New York City (Lieberson and Waters, 1988; Bills, 2005). 
Others have examined local marriage markets such as schools or workplaces (Bozon and 
                                                            
23 As mentioned in Section 2, Nielsen and Svarer (2009) find that around half of the observed educational 
homogamy is attributable to matching opportunities. Besides the econometric reasons discussed earlier, one 
possible explanation for the greater role of opportunities found in our study than in theirs is that we look at the 
dating game rather than at final matches. 
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Héran, 1989; Kalmijn and Flap, 2001; Nielsen and Svarer, 2009). But the demographic 
(including gender) composition of a specific population cannot be seen separately from the 
regional distribution of groups. If people base their decision to live in a given area on factors 
that are not independent of in-group preferences, then mating preferences cannot be 
distinguished from partners’ availability in standard observational data. Here is where the 
speed dating setup of our study turns out to be very important. Despite this, a more precise 
definition and a better measurement of the concept of marriage market are needed. 
The result that many traits (including education and occupation) can explain little of 
the variation in people’s desirability in speed dating events is also noteworthy, especially 
because these attributes have been reported as important determinants of mate preferences in 
other circumstances (Hout, 1982; Mare, 1991; Kalmijn, 1994; Pencavel, 1998). It is of course 
possible that these traits do not show up strongly in speed dating events, not because they are 
intrinsically unimportant, but because they are traits for which it is difficult to gain reliable 
information in a short interaction (Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela, 2009). It is however unclear 
why speed daters are substantially less able to assess each others’ schooling or wealth than 
individuals in the context of personal ads or online dating, where researchers have found 
consistent preferences for status and education (Lynn and Shurgot, 1984; Pawłowski and 
Koziel, 2002; Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely, 2010) and where the reliability of the information 
posted cannot be easily checked. More broadly, these findings underline the need to build a 
more cohesive picture of the attributes of individuals that make them more desirable in the 
mating market and how the set of such attributes may change in different dating 
environments. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzes dating behavior using new data from a large UK speed dating 
agency. It pursues two primary goals. The first is to shed light on the nature of people’s 
preferences when selecting mates. We find that speed daters’ proposals are primarily driven 
by assortative preferences and less by generally agreed-upon mate values, with both women 
and men preferring partners of similar age and education. We also find that women and men 
equally value observable physical attributes: women prefer men who are young and tall, 
while men are more attracted to women who are young and thin. And partner’s education and 
occupation too have an impact on desirability, irrespective of gender. 
The second goal of the paper is to provide empirical evidence on the importance of 
meeting opportunities in explaining patterns of dating proposals and matches. Our results 
indicate that the role of preferences is generally counterbalanced, and sometimes even 
overshadowed, by that of meeting opportunities. This finding stresses the need to gain deeper 
insights and a better measurement on the wide variety of formal and informal institutions that 
give rise to what we call marriage markets and that shape mate selection, dating behavior, 
courtship, and matchmaking. 
This work contributes to the growing economics literature that emphasizes the 
importance of studying mate choice and estimates individual preferences in dating partners 
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(Bisin, Topa, and Verdier 2004; Choo and Siow, 2006; Fisman et al. 2006 and 2008; Nielsen 
and Svarer, 2009; Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely, 2010) as well as to the broader scientific 
literature that increasingly uses speed dating procedures to study the evolution of mate 
choices and relationship dynamics (e.g., Kurzban and Weeden, 2005; Finkel, Eastwick, 
Matthews, 2007; Todd et al. 2007). 
A number of extensions would be desirable, even within our speed dating context. 
First, incorporating how speed daters learn about their potential partners’ characteristics 
(either during the meeting or browsing their profiles) would give us a deeper understanding 
of dating preferences, which may also have ramifications for theory. Second, a methodology 
similar to that applied here could be used to analyze different substantive issues (such as the 
extent to which dating preferences differ by ethnicity), different rules of the game (e.g., 
allowing participants to interact for more/less than three minutes or letting them know they 
have received a proposal even if they do not reciprocate), different agencies that target 
specific populations (in terms of age, occupation, race, or religion), and speed daters in 
different countries. Finally, an ambitious extension is to follow speed daters over time and 
observe how their matches evolve. This will allow us to have a better view on how they 
screen potential partners and eventually form durable long-term relationships. 
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Table 1 
Sample Characteristics of Speed Dating Events 
 
 Mean  Std. dev. Min Max 
     
Number of female subjects (Nm = 84) 22.3 3.9 15 31 
Number of male subjects (Nm = 84) 22.3 3.9 15 30 
Number of proposals made per 
meeting by: 
    
Female subjects (Ni = 1868) 2.6 3.1 0 30 
Male subjects (Ni = 1870) 5.0 5.8 0 30 
Number of proposals received per 
meeting by: 
    
Male partners (Nj = 1870) 2.6 3.1 0 18 
Female partners (Nj = 1868) 5.0 4.4 0 22 
Number of matches per meeting 22 20 2 117 
Share of proposals matched (as a 
fraction of all proposals) for: 
 
 
   
Female subjects (Obs = 4119) 0.45    
Male subjects (Obs = 9467) 0.20    
     
 
Note: Nm is the number of events (or markets), Ni is the number of subjects, Nj is the number of 
partners, and ‘Obs’ refers to the number of subject-partner pairs in which the subject has made a 
proposal. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Subjects’ Attributes 
 
 Women  Men 
 Speed dating BHPS Speed dating BHPS 
      
Age (years) 34.5 (7.5) 
0.217 
[1,776] 
32.7 (9.4) 
0.287 
[1,351] 
35.8 (6.9) 
0.193 
[1,828] 
30.5 (9.1) 
0.298 
[1,200] 
University degree or greater 
qualification 
0.66 
0.322 
[974] 
0.20 
0.797 
[1248] 
0.65 
0.339 
[1071] 
0.20 
0.803 
[1053] 
Occupation     
Professional and managerial 0.36 
0.611 
0.33 
0.672 
0.43 
0.521 
0.24 
0.755 
Skilled non manual 0.50 
0.486 
0.19 
0.802 
0.40 
0.583 
0.16 
0.827 
Other occupationsa  0.14 
0.877 
[1008] 
0.48 
0.520 
[862] 
0.17 
0.827 
[1110] 
0.60 
0.403 
[905] 
Height (cm) 165.4 (6.7) 
0.041 
[1008] 
163.8 (6.4) 
0.039 
[1270] 
 179.1 (6.9) 
0.039 
[1139] 
178.4 (7.4) 
0.041 
[1095] 
Weight (kg) 57.8 (5.9) 
0.102 
 [334] 
66.4 (14.0) 
0.211 
[1192] 
 77.6 (10.0) 
0.129 
 [774] 
79.9 (15.5) 
0.194 
[1067] 
Share underweightb 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.02 
Share overweightc 0.05 0.38 0.29 0.45 
Smoking 0.13 
0.824 
[844] 
0.38 
0.619 
[1278] 
 0.09 
0.886 
[1045] 
0.36 
0.636 
[1101] 
      
 
Note: In each cell, we report the mean, the standard deviation in parentheses, the coefficient of variation (which, in the 
case of the speed dating sample is a weighted average by market, with weights given by the number of participants 
over the total population of speed daters) in italics, and the number of subjects in square brackets. Standard deviations 
are not reported for dummy variables. 
a Includes workers in manual occupations, self-employed, full-time students, and individuals in other jobs.  
b If BMI<18.5. 
c If BMI>25.  
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Table 3  
Correlation Coefficients and Odds Ratios in Female and Male Attributes 
 
 Female-male  Odds ratios 
 correlation 
(all speed 
daters) 
All speed 
daters 
Matched 
pairs 
Test of 
equality 
(p-value) 
     
Agea 0.904** 
(0.002) 
2.39** 
(0.003) 
11.01** 
(0.97) 
0.000 
     
University degree or greater 
qualification 
0.091 
(0.413) 
1.10** 
(0.002) 
1.54** 
(0.13) 
0.004 
     
Professional and managerial 
occupations 
0.052 
(0.652) 
1.01 
(0.02) 
1.25* 
(0.12) 
0.013 
     
Heighta 0.103 
(0.389) 
1.04* 
(0.05) 
1.08 
(0.09) 
0.933 
     
Overweight 0.031 
(0.780) 
1.00 
(0.16) 
0.69 
(0.76) 
0.421 
     
Smoking 0.232** 
(0.030) 
1.18** 
(0.01) 
1.81* 
(0.41) 
0.059 
     
 
Note: The figures in the first column are correlation coefficients between male and female attributes. 
Their standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped from 100 replications. The figures in the second 
and third columns are odds ratios obtained from logistic regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
In the column labelled ‘Test of equality’ we report the p-value of the test that the odds ratio in the 
second column equals the corresponding odds ratio in the third column.  
a Odds ratios for this attribute are computed using two distinct groups, that is, individuals who are 
above the average age or height, and individuals who are at the average or below.  
The ‘**’ in the first column indicates that a correlation is significantly different from zero at the 1 
percent level. The ‘*’ and ‘**’ in the second and third columns indicate that an odds ratio is 
significantly different from one at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 4  
Demand for Partner’s Attributes 
 
 Subject’s gender  
 Female Male Test equality of 
coefficients 
(p-value) 
Age (years) -0.005 -0.011 0.000 
(0.000)*** (0.000)***  
University degree or greater 
qualification 
-0.001 0.018 0.002 
(0.004) (0.005)***  
Professional and managerial 0.063 -0.070 0.000 
 (0.024)** (0.025)***  
Skilled non-manual 0.068 -0.074 0.000 
 (0.024)*** (0.025)***  
Other occupations 0.052 -0.096 0.000 
 (0.025)** (0.025)***  
Smoking -0.016 -0.040 0.014 
 (0.006)** (0.008)***  
Height (normalised) 0.004 0.008 0.084 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)***  
Weight (normalised) 0.009 -0.009 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)***  
Missing education  -0.016 0.022 0.001 
 (0.007)** (0.009)**  
Missing occupation 0.047 -0.122 0.000 
 (0.025)* (0.026)***  
Missing smoking status 0.014 0.003 0.228 
 (0.006)** (0.006)  
Missing height -0.033 0.000 0.000 
 (0.009)*** (0.000)  
Missing weight 0.010 -0.041 0.000 
 (0.004)*** (0.005)***  
Constant 0.235 0.724 0.000 
 (0.026)*** (0.027)***  
Observations 41767 40544  
R-squared 0.03 0.07  
 
Note: Estimates are obtained from linear probability models including subject fixed effects. The variables 
“height” and “weight” have been normalised by subtracting the corresponding sample mean and dividing by 
the sample standard deviation. Observations are at the subject-partner meeting level. 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 5 
Assortative preferences   
 
 Subject’s gender 
 Female Male Female Male 
Age     
Man is between 0 and 5 years older 
 
0.039  
(0.003)*** 
0.061   
(0.004)*** 
  
Man is 5 years older or more 
 
.  -0.054 
(0.005)*** 
-0.040 
(0.006)***
Woman is older 
 
  -0.022 
(0.005)*** 
-0.081 
(0.006)***
Education     
Similar education level  
 
0.017  
(0.003)*** 
0.022   
(0.004)*** 
  
Man is more educated 
 
  -0.022 
(0.086) 
-0.088 
(0.083) 
Woman is more educated 
 
  -0.000 
(0.086) 
0.051 
(0.083) 
Occupation     
Similar occupation  0.007   
(0.005) 
0.006   
(0.006) 
  
Both students   -0.010 -0.241 
   (0.100) (0.125)* 
Both self-employed   0.106 -0.309 
   (0.131) (0.163)* 
Both manual   -0.012 0.001 
   (0.023) (0.028) 
Both skilled/non manual   0.001 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
Both prof/man 
 
  0.010 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
Smoking      
Similar smoking status 0.025  
(0.012)** 
0.014 
(.014) 
  
Both smoke  
 
 0.045 
(0.089) 
0.068 
(0.088) 
Both do not smoke  
 
 0.003 
(0.086) 
-0.040 
(0.084) 
Height     
Man is between 0 and 7 cm taller  0.006   
(0.005) 
0.028    
(0.006)*** 
  
Man is more than 7 cm taller  
 
 0.021 
(0.007)*** 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
Woman is taller  
 
 -0.032 
(0.006)*** 
-0.046 
(0.008)***
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Weight 
Similar BMI 
 
0.000   
(0.007) 
0.012   
(0.009) 
  
Woman overweight and man not 
overweight 
  0.109 
(0.121) 
0.047 
(0.087) 
Man overweight and woman not 
overweight 
 
  -0.119 
(0.125) 
0.014 
(0.071) 
N. obs 46065 46065 46065 46035 
R-squared 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.18 
Note: Estimates are obtained from linear probability models including subject and partner fixed effects. The 
similarity variables are defined as follows: Education: both no degree or both with university degree, 
Occupation: both students, both self-employed, both skilled non manual, both manual, both 
professional/managerial; Smoking status: Both smoking, both not smoking; BMI: Both underweight, both 
normal weight, both overweight. Observations are at the subject-partner meeting level. 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
 
 
Table 6 
Multiplicity Tests 
 
 Covariance 
between 
female/male 
proposals 
 
Bootstrap 
standard  
error 
 
 
 
Wald test 
 
 
 
N 
     
All markets 0.173 0.157 0.018 41835 
     
Small markets 0.173 0.158 0.017 21051 
     
Large markets 0.173 0.157 0.019 20784 
     
 
Note: All tests have been performed using the de Paula-Tang’s (2011) algorithm. The number of bootstrap repetitions for 
the calculation of the standard errors is 1000. N is the number of games. A market is small if it presents subjects with 23 
or fewer partners and large if it presents subjects with 24 or more partners. 
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Table 7  
Opportunities and Preferences in the Speed Dating Market – Relative Abundance of 
Attributes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Age 
(mean) 
(2) 
University 
degree or 
greater 
qualification
(3) 
Professional 
and 
managerial 
occupations 
(4) 
Height 
(mean) 
(5) 
Overweight 
(6) 
Smoking 
A. Partner’s attributes      
Female subject       
0α  -8.75** 
(1.87) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-8.75 
(17.63) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
1α  1.18** 
(0.05) 
1.11** 
(0.09) 
1.03** 
(0.13) 
1.05**
(0.10) 
1.19** 
(0.13) 
1.30** 
(0.10) 
F test )1( 1 =α  0.001† 0.268 0.806 0.636 0.122 0.005† 
F test )1,0( 10 == αα  0.000 0.399 0.896 0.130 0.297 0.018 
R2 0.864 0.633 0.433 0.585 0.538 0.657 
Observations 84 81 81 82 81 84 
Male subject       
0α  -7.34** 
(1.56) 
0.10* 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
7.18 
(10.47) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
1α  1.13** 
(0.04) 
0.90** 
(0.06) 
0.94** 
(0.07) 
0.96**
(0.06) 
0.86** 
(0.04) 
1.09** 
(0.07) 
F test )1( 1 =α  0.005† 0.085 0.388 0.509 0.140 0.202 
F test )1,0( 10 == αα  0.000† 0.000 0.465 0.229 0.194 0.263 
R2 0.886 0.762 0.717 0.737 0.787 0.729 
Observations 84 84 78 84 80 84 
       
B. Subject’s attributes      
Female subject       
1β  0.88** 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.09 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
R2 0.647 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.042 0.042 
Observations 84 83 82 82 79 82 
Male subject       
1β  1.13** 
(0.08) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.10 
(0.15) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
R2 0.704 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.003 
Observations 84 83 82 82 79 82 
Note: Ordinary least squares estimates; standard errors in parentheses. Figures in panel A are obtained from the estimation of 
equation (3); those in panel B are from equation (5) which includes a constant (see text). Observations are at the meeting level. 
In the rows labelled ‘F test’, we report the p-value of the test that α1=1 or of the test that α0=0 and α1=1. 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
† indicates that equality is rejected (at 5 percent).  
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Table 8 
Opportunities and Preferences in the Speed Dating Market – Market Homogeneity 
 
 Age Education Occupation Height BMI Smoking 
Female subject       
0γ  0.15**  
(0.03) 
0.03  
(0.05) 
0.03  
(0.05) 
-0.16**  
(0.04) 
-0.25  
(0.13) 
0.69** 
(0.12) 
1γ  0.75  
(0.12) 
0.96** 
(0.10) 
0.87** 
(0.11) 
0.88**  
(0.09) 
1.35**  
(0.18) 
0.28** 
(0.10) 
1,0: 100 == γγH  
(p-value) 
0.00† 0.76 0.19 0.00† 0.16 0.01† 
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84 
 
Male subject 
      
0γ  0.09**  
(0.02) 
0.02  
(0.04) 
-0.06  
(0.03) 
-0.07  
(0.04) 
-0.23**  
(0.07) 
-0.07  
(0.07) 
1γ  0.92**  
(0.07) 
0.98  
(0.09) 
1.16** 
(0.08) 
0.76**  
(0.07) 
1.27** 
(0.09) 
1.11**  
(0.08) 
1,0: 100 == γγH   
(p-value) 
0.00† 0.71 0.12 0.00† 0.00† 0.06 
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Note: Ordinary least squares estimates; standard errors in parentheses. Figures are obtained from the estimation of equation (7). 
Observations are at the meeting level. Homogeneity in attributes is defined as follows: Age: Man is at most 5 years older than the woman; 
Education: Both with less than A-level qualifications, or both with A-level (or equivalent) qualifications, or both with university degree; 
Occupation: Both in professional-managerial occupations, or both in skilled non-manual occupations, or both in manual occupations or 
both students; Height: Man at most 7 centimetres taller than the woman; BMI: Both overweight, or both normal, or both underweight; 
Smoking: Both smoking, or both not smoking. 
** significant at 1 percent. 
† indicates that equality is rejected (at 5 percent).  
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Figure 1. Joint (Female and Male) Average Distribution of Attributes  
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Figure 2. Selection and Partners’ Supply – Male Subjects 
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Each dot represents means or shares of characteristics of partners in a specific meeting. The straight line is the 45 degree line.  
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Figure 3. Selection and Partners’ Supply – Female Subjects 
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Each dot represents means or shares of characteristics of partners in a specific meeting. The straight line is the 45 degree line.  
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Figure 4. Selection and Market Homogeneity – Male Subjects 
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Each dot represents means or shares of characteristics of partners in a specific meeting. The straight line is the 45 degree line.  
Similar attributes are defined as follows: Age: Man is at most 5 years older than the woman; education: Education (less than a-levels, 
a-levels and university degree); Occupation: Both professional-managerial, both skilled non-manual, both manual or both students, 
Height: Man at most 7 centimetres taller than the woman; BMI: Both overweight, both normal, both underweight; Smoking: Both 
smoking, both not smoking. 
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Figure 5. Selection and Market Homogeneity – Female Subjects 
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Each dot represents means or shares of characteristics of partners in a specific meeting. The straight line is the 45 degree line.  
Similar attributes are defined as follows: Age: Man is at most 5 years older than the woman; education: Education (less than a-levels, 
a-levels and university degree); Occupation: Both professional-managerial, both skilled non-manual, both manual or both students, 
Height: Man at most 7 centimetres taller than the woman; BMI: Both overweight, both normal, both underweight; Smoking: Both 
smoking, both not smoking. 
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